Andrews et al. criticize Gould and colleagues for (1) failing to provide evidentiary criteria for accepting exaptationist alternatives to adaptationist explanations, and (2) seeing exaptations and spandrels as being far more frequent than adaptations in the evolutionary history of modern humans. I argue that the first of these criticisms is wrong, and the second reflects a bias for the classical version of Darwinian evolutionary theory, which Gould was trying to expand by proposing concepts like exaptation and spandrels.

This volume continues the biography that Ellis Yochelson began with Charles Doolittle Walcott: Paleontologist , which Ronald Rainger reviewed for Isis . The present volume covers Walcott's years as Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, from 6 May 1907 until his death on 9 February 1927. The precise dates here are simply a sign that, mutatis mutandi, most of Rainger's criticisms regarding the first volume also apply to the second. Yochelson continues with his rigidly chronological presentation, including virtually every recorded event (...) from Walcott's daily life during these nearly twenty years, with almost no selectivity. This is a particularly frustrating method of presentation for several reasons. Not only is almost everything of apparently equal value—administrative and scientific work and controversies, Christmas and Thanksgiving holidays, and the multiple trips to the dentist to remove teeth, one by one, in the latter chapters—but the interwoven presentation makes it very hard to follow the threads of the different stories that are of real interest to a historian. Events that unfolded over years here are revealed over the course of chapters, often one line at a time. While reading the book I often felt that I had been hijacked on the New York City subway system and that the train was hurtling from one station to another, along every line, with no apparent reason and hardly any indication of where I was headed. Surely not even in his own living of his life could Walcott have experienced it as so without organization.This book is not without themes, however, and several finally become very apparent. First, Yochelson evidently believes that Walcott was a near‐perfect scientist and administrator. Second, Yochelson obviously does not approve of a number of things about the more recent history of the Smithsonian and Congress's way of dealing with the institution. Third, Yochelson very much disagrees with Stephen Jay Gould's treatment of Walcott in Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History . Treating these in reverse order: Gould does not need whatever poor defense I might be able to make. Yochelson's presentation might have more credibility if he did not seem so pointedly sarcastic at times. And Walcott does not have to have been perfect to have been highly influential. Walcott and historians alike will be much better served when some historians sit down to study him as a human being, replete with abilities and foibles, a man of his time, a scientist, businessman, and administrator, with a hand in much of the development of the late nineteenth‐ and early twentieth‐century American scientific establishment. This treatment will of necessity be different than Yochelson's “day‐planner” approach. Finally, Yochelson could profitably have taken a lesson from Walcott, who evidently devoted much more time to proofreading than Yochelson did. This book is replete with typographical errors, at least some of which are also obvious errors of fact. This should make readers hesitant to rely on Yochelson alone as an authority.Yochelson has performed a useful task in drawing attention to Walcott, but I hope this work spurs historians to give him sustained, serious, and discriminating attention. His well‐documented career gives every indication of providing rich rewards to such study. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 122.2 (2001) 223-253 [Access article in PDF] The Economics Of Roman Elegy: Voluntary Poverty, The Recusatio, And The Greedy Girl Sharon L. James Roman love elegy presents sexual relationships between elite men and women of lower status in apparently reversed gender and power positions, so that the male is enslaved to his beloved domina. This metaphorical reversal, however, actually retains standard Roman social structures, (...) suggesting an inequity even within a private love affair: rather than sharing goals and desires, lover and beloved stand in a gendered opposition. Historically, elegy has been interpreted from the perspective of its male speakers, and much scholarship has focused on the characterizations of those speakers. But as it is legitimate to study the male elegiac speakers' viewpoint, it is likewise appropriate to consider that of his preferred love object and frequent addressee, the elegiac doctapuella. Since much of elegy is directed at a fictive, if named, woman, 1 such an approach may illuminate some of its rhetorical strategies and gender values, particularly as they derive from and relate to Roman gendered power constructs. Since elegy in particular generically anticipates the perspective of the docta puella, 2 and makes it a structural element of the [End Page 223] genre, to read elegy from that perspective provides both a necessary corrective or balance to the dominant male voice of the genre and a revelation of its inherent disingenuity. I will examine two related topoi of elegy--the recusatio and the problem of the "greedy girl"--from the position of the puella, a viewpoint that demonstrates the relationship between these two topoi and reveals the engine of Roman love elegy to be self-interested sexual persuasion rather than sincere confession of passion. 3This approach requires identifying the elegiac puella, the counterpart to the recognizable elite male speaker of Roman love elegy, the lover-poet. In my view, she is a fictional construct based upon the courtesan of New Comedy--that is, she is an elegant, educated woman who has no financial security and thus must earn her own living while she can. 4 [End Page 224] Identifying her in this way has several consequences, but only two concern us here.The first consequence is that many apparently individual character traits in an elegiac puella turn out to be professionally motivated behavior, as dictated by both Dipsas and Acanthis in Amores 1.8 and Propertius 4.5. A primary example is greed, for which the elegiac speakers never tire of criticizing their puellae, as though avaritia were a character flaw of a specific woman rather than a professional obligation. 5 Thus, when the lover-poet in Propertius 2.16 complains that Cynthia always weighs the purses of her lovers ("semper amatorum ponderat una sinus," 2.16.12), he is actually describing the behavior prescribed for her not only by the lena Acanthis, in poem 4.5 but in the pages of Roman comedy as well. 6 Comedy routinely presents the courtesan's needs and the young lover's desires as being at odds. The same structure of economic opposition governs the elegiac love affair: the puella plays a generic, professional part that may conflict with her personal inclinations or character (cf. Thais and Bacchis in Ter. Eun. and Hecyra). She is also presented as retaining her self-control while her impassioned lover loses his. 7 Like other courtesans of Roman comedy, Phronesium (Plaut. Truc.) is fully aware of both her present material and social circumstances and the [End Page 225] expiration date of her professional viability. Thus she necessarily seeks money and gifts from her lovers, both to maintain her attractions as an elegant woman 8 and to prepare for the future when she will no longer be able to practice her profession. Her literary granddaughter, the elegiac puella, does likewise (see, as noted above, the instruction of Acanthis and Dipsas, particularly lines 59-62 of Prop. 4.5 and 49-56 of Am. 1.8), and here it is worth recalling that even the male speakers of elegy allude... (shrink)

Four Views on Christian Metaphysics presents four prominent views held among Christians today on the major questions in philosophical metaphysics. What is the nature of existence itself? What is it for something to exist? What are universals? What is the soul? How do these things relate to God, in light of special and general revelation? The four Christian perspectives presented in this book are: Platonism, Aristotelianism, idealism, and postmodernism. The purpose of this book is to help Christians think deeply and (...) carefully about a Christian view of the ultimate nature of reality and our place in it. (shrink)

This paper investigates the drivers and inhibitors of Internet privacy concern. Applying the Multidimensional Development Theory to the online environment, we identify the important factors under four dimensions—i.e., environmental, individual, information management, and interaction management. We tested our model using data from an online survey of 2417 individuals in Hong Kong. The results show that the factors under all four dimensions are significant in the formation of Internet privacy concern. Specifically, familiarity with government legislation, Internet knowledge, benefit of information disclosure, (...) privacy protection, and social presence reduce Internet privacy concern, while individuals’ previous privacy invasion experience, risk avoidance personality, and sensitivity of information requested by websites increase Internet privacy concern. We conducted an analysis of unobserved heterogeneity to confirm the significance of these factors. A follow-up moderation analysis shows that the individual factors moderate the effects of the information management factor and the interaction management factors. The findings provide an integrated understanding of the formation of Internet privacy concern. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that selective abortion for disability often involves inadequate counselling on the part of reproductive medicine professionals who advise prospective parents. I claim that prenatal disability clinicians often fail in intellectual duty—they are culpably ignorant about intellectual disability. First, I explain why a standard motivation for selective abortion is flawed. Second, I summarize recent research on parent experience with prenatal professionals. Third, I outline the notions of epistemic excellence and deficiency. Fourth, I defend culpable ignorance as (...) the best explanation of inadequate disability counselling. Fifth, I rebut alternative explanations. My focus is pregnancies diagnosed with mild or moderate intellectual disability. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic provides a real-world context for evaluating the fairness of disability-based rationing of scarce medical resources. I discuss three situations clinicians may face: rationing based on disability itself; rationing based on inevitable disability-related comorbidities; and rationing based on preventable disability-related comorbidities. I defend three conclusions. First, in a just distribution, extraneous factors do not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing based on disability alone, where no comorbidities decrease a person’s capacity to benefit from treatment. Second, in (...) a just distribution, undeserved luck does not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing for biologically caused comorbidities that decrease capacity to benefit. Third, in a just distribution, social injustice does not influence a person’s share. This rules out rationing for socially caused comorbidities that decrease capacity to benefit. (shrink)

Research shows that a high majority of parents receiving prenatal diagnosis of intellectual disability terminate pregnancy. They have reasons for rejecting a child with intellectual disabilities—these reasons are, most commonly, beliefs about quality of life for it or them. Without a negative evaluation of intellectual disability, their choice makes no sense. Disability-based abortion has been critiqued through virtue ethics for being inconsistent with admirable moral character. Parental selectivity conflicts with the virtue of acceptingness and exhibits the vice of wilfulness. In (...) this paper I claim that, beyond failures of moral virtue, disability abortion often involves failures of epistemic virtue on the part of parents. I argue two things: parents believe something false, or at least contested, about life with intellectual disability—and they do so because they are not epistemically conscientious. I first explain why a central motivation for disability abortion—that it prevents harm to the child—is mistaken. I next give a brief account of intellectual virtue and culpable ignorance. I then indicate why many parents fail to be intellectually virtuous when choosing to terminate pregnancy. I focus on elimination of intellectual disability and have little to say about physical and sensory impairments. (shrink)

The common belief is that disability is bad for the person who is disabled, that it has a negative effect on well-being. Some disability rights activists and philosophers, however, assert that disability has little or no impact on how well a person’s life goes, that it is neutral with respect to flourishing. In recent articles Stephen Campbell and Joseph Stramondo, while rejecting both views, claim that we cannot make any broad generalizations about the effect of disability on well-being. Whether they (...) are right about physical and sensory disabilities, I do not know, but I argue that they are wrong about intellectual disabilities. A broad generalization about intellectual disabilities is justified: it always has a negative impact on quality of life, even though there is no single negative impact. The disadvantages of ID are plain but complicated. (shrink)

In this paper I defend three points: (1) God loves and desires the salvation of every human person, (2) saving grace is available outside of the Christian church to those who do not hear the gospel but pursue moral goodness and (3) most, if not all, human persons will be saved. I argue that soteriological restrictivism is logically incoherent since its two ideas—every person is loved by God and only those who hear and believe the Christian gospel can be saved—cannot (...) both be true. Throughout I integrate insights from Karl Rahner’snotion of “anonymous Christianity.”. (shrink)

Much research in the field of emotions has shown that people differ in the cues that they use to perceive their own emotions. People who are more responsive to personal cues (personal cuers) make use of cues arising from their own bodies and behavior; people who are less responsive to personal cues (situational cuers) make use of cues arising from the world around them. An evolutionary explanation of this well-documented phenomenon is that it occurs because of the operation of a (...) cognitive module designed to enable the organism to predict its own impending behavior. This theory suggests that situational cuers would be people for whom external factors are the best source of information about their own future behavior, whereas personal cuers are people for whom cues about themselves are the best source of information about their own future behavior. Such a view is founded in the New Realist philosophy of the early twentieth century, a philosophy that affected psychology through the work of E. C. Tolman and J. J. Gibson. (shrink)

The traditional elimination view affirms that people with intellectual disabilities will be healed in heaven when God restores all things to what they were meant to be. Several contemporary scholars, however, have put forth a revisionist retention view claiming that people with intellectual disabilities will not be healed in heaven. While the elimination view has strong biblical and theological credentials, it faces a significant philosophical difficulty. Heaven must maintain identity so that individuals exist as the same people they were in (...) life. But post-mortem healing appears to disrupt the identity of people with intellectual disabilities. In this paper I reject this charge. I argue that for individuals with mild or moderate intellectual disabilities heaven preserves personal identity, while for individuals with profound intellectual disabilities heaven creates personal identity. These conclusions rest on an emergentist anthropology which I describe. (shrink)

Political theory contains two views of social care for people with intellectual disabilities. The favor view treats disability services as an undeserved gratuity, while the entitlement view sees them as a deserved right. This paper argues that David Hume is one philosophical source of the favor view; he bases political membership on a threshold level of mental capacity and shuts out anyone who falls below. Hume’s account, which excludes people with intellectual disabilities from justice owing to their lack of power, (...) but includes them in charity, is morally deficient. The shortcomings of Hume’s theory underscore the necessity of having a view of justice which ensures that people with intellectual disabilities are not marginalized. In defending the entitlement view, I integrate philosophical analysis and concrete examples of policy issues. (shrink)

Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring (...) with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal offers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative. (shrink)

The overall purpose of this paper is to clarify the physical meaning and epistemological status of the term 'measurement' as used in quantum theory. After a review of the essential logical structure of quantum physics, Part I presents interpretive discussions contrasting the quantal concepts observable and ensemble with their classical ancestors along the lines of Margenau's latency theory. Against this background various popular ideas concerning the nature of quantum measurement are critically surveyed. The analysis reveals that, in addition to internal (...) mathematical difficulties, all the so-called quantum theories of measurement are grounded in unjustifiable, classical presuppositions. (shrink)

In this essay, Kant's so-called argument for god's existence is analyzed and interpreted in light of the claim that the problem of god's existence correctly falls under the question "what may I hope?" ("critique of pure reason", A805=b833 ff.). It is maintained that Kant has established that the rational thing for the moral person to do is to hope for god's existence.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22.1 (2002) 251-254 [Access article in PDF] James Fredericks Interview The 2002 winner of the Frederick J.Streng Book Award is James Fredericks, professor ofTheological Studies at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, California. Professor Fredericks received the award for his book, Faith Among Faiths: Christian Theology and the Non-Christian Religions, published by Paulist Press (New York) in 2001. Buddhist-Christian Studies asked James about his (...) writing of the volume.Buddhist-Christian Studies: Why did you write Faith Among Faiths?James Fredericks: I wanted to help Christians think about the problems that the "pluralist" view of religious diversity poses for inter-religious dialogue.How does the book do that?By making a sustained criticism of the claim that religions are differing interpretations of the same transcendent "Reality." This notion is a problem for a religion of revelation, like Christianity, but also for a religion like Buddhism that has a sophisticated critique of metaphysics. Pluralist thinkers impose a meta-religious grand narrative on all the religions and demand that the religions conform to this grand narrative in the name of "tolerance."This kind of thinking has roots in the European Enlightenment and has affinities with some strands of Hindu thought, especially the "neo-Hindu" thinkers. I do not think that this approach fosters dialogue in depth. If Buddhism and Christianity are varying interpretations of the same ultimate "Reality," then what does Buddhism have to teach Christians that is of genuine theological importance? The obvious differences that distinguish Buddhism from Christianity are of little theological interest to Christians because they are of no soteriological consequence. The pluralist approach is a dead end for dialogue.And the way forward?What I call "comparative theology." I think of this as an alternative to what Christians call the "theology of religions."What's the difference?Theologies of religion interpret the meaning of other religious traditions from within the perspective of Christian tradition. Karl Rahner's theology of the anonymous Christian and Karl Barth's rejection of all religions as "unbelief" are both examples of a theology of religion. John Hick's pluralist model of religions is also a kind of theology of religions. This entire project has reached an impasse within Christianity. As an alternative, I propose that Christians recognize that Buddhism and Christianity [End Page 251] are linked by some significant similarities and distinguished from each other by significant differences.How does that break the impasse?Christians have something of genuine value to learn by entering humbly into dialogue with Buddhists. By taking differences seriously, dialogue becomes a way for Christians to do their own theology collaboratively with Buddhists. In the medieval period, Christians did theology in dialogue with Aristotle and Plato. Today, I want Christians to do theology in dialogue with Nagarjuna and Dogen. Therefore doing theology comparatively is to step beyond the notion of a theology of religions. Comparative theology does not begin with the assumption that Buddhism is a relatively obscured form of the same truth Christians affirm (Rahner) or that Buddhism and Christianity are relatively equal expressions of a truth that transcends them both (Hick). The purpose of dialogue is not to show how we are all really trying to say the same thing. ForChristians, at least, dialogue with Buddhists is a genuinely demanding way of doing theology.Any other reasons for the book?Yes. To promote friendships among Buddhists and Christians. These "inter-religious friendships" are a good way for Christians to practice their faith. My own friendships with Buddhists, both here in the USA and in Asia, are central to my spirituality and my work as a theologian. In a sense, I have never been in dialogue with "Buddhism." All my dialogues have been with actual Buddhists, with all their personal strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures. I am happy to say that, over the years, I have had some skillful teachers who have taught me not only the Dharma, but also taught me new ways to think about Christianity.Was it a difficult book to write?My book was written after years of dialogue with Buddhists and much research and... (shrink)

College courses are often disconnected both from other disciplines and from student’s lives. When classes are taught in isolation from each other students experience them as unrelated fragments. In addition, college courses often lack personal meaning and relevance. Interdisciplinary learning communities—classes in which the subject matters of two or more fields are integrated—can help overcome these two problems by providing an education that is holistic and coherent. In this paper I report on how philosophy courses can be blended with English (...) classes and how theoretical perspectives can be connected to student’s personal lives. (shrink)

Traditional views of grace assert that God owes us nothing. Grace is undeserved, supererogatory and free. In this paper I argue that while this is an accurate characterization of creating grace, it is not true of saving grace. We have no right to be created as spiritual beings whose true good is found in relationship with God. But once we exist as spiritual beings, God does owe us a genuine offer of the salvation that constitutes our highest fulfillment. Creating grace (...) is undeserved. Saving grace is deserved (being based on our inherent worth and vital interests as spiritual beings) but unearned (it is not based on anything we have done). (shrink)

Thomas I-Iurka has recently proposed a utilitarian theory which would effect a compromise between Average and Total utilitarianism, the better to deal with issues in population ethics. This Compromise theory would incorporate the principle that the value which an extra happy person contributes to a possible world is a decreasing function of the total population of that world: that happy people are of diminishing marginal value. In spite of its initial plausibility I argue against this principle. I show that the (...) Compromise theory is actually no improvement over the two original versions of utilitaiianism; in particular, it is subject to almost all the objections which are fatal to Average utilitarianism, and more besides. And I attempt to dispell the appearance that intuition supports the Compromise theory as against Total utilitarianism, by arguing that the 1atter’s "Repugnant Conclusion," when properly understood, is not intuitively unacceptable. Total utilitarianism remains a plausible ethical theory, while both the Average and the Compromise theories should be definitely rejected. (shrink)

This communication is part I of a series of papers which explore the theoretical possibility of generalizing quantum dynamics in such a way that the predicted motions of an isolated system would include the irreversible (entropy-increasing) state evolutions that seem essential if the second law of thermodynamics is ever to become a theorem of mechanics. In this first paper, the general mathematical framework for describing linear but not necessarily Hamiltonian mappings of the statistical operator is reviewed, with particular attention to (...) detailed representations of the Kossakowski conditions for the case of a two-level system. (shrink)

I argue that life after death (understood as personal survival of one's death) is an appropriate object of one's hope, despite the fact that it may not be an appropriate object of one's belief. That is, the hope for life after death is a reasonable hope. Whereas the belief that there is a life after death may not be a justified belief.I begin by discussing and clarifying the phenomenon of hoping and developing a logical analysis of the concept of hope. (...) Hoping is then distinguished from both wishing and believing. Next I discuss what must obtain before we consider a hope to be a reasonable one or to be justified. Finally I demonstrate that at least one form of life after death meets the conditions for justified hope. (shrink)

I consider the role of cognitive modeling in cognitive science. Modeling, and the computers that enable it, are central to the field, but the role of modeling is often misunderstood. Models are not intended to capture fully the processes they attempt to elucidate. Rather, they are explorations of ideas about the nature of cognitive processes. In these explorations, simplification is essential—through simplification, the implications of the central ideas become more transparent. This is not to say that simplification has no downsides; (...) it does, and these are discussed. I then consider several contemporary frameworks for cognitive modeling, stressing the idea that each framework is useful in its own particular ways. Increases in computer power (by a factor of about 4 million) since 1958 have enabled new modeling paradigms to emerge, but these also depend on new ways of thinking. Will new paradigms emerge again with the next 1,000‐fold increase? (shrink)

Expressivists about normative thought and discourse traditionally deny that there are nondeflationary normative propositions. However, it has recently been suggested that expressivists might avoid a number of problems by providing a theory of normative propositions compatible with expressivism. This paper explores the prospects for developing an expressivist theory of propositions within the framework of cognitive act theories of propositions. First, I argue that the only extant expressivist theory of cognitive propositions—Michael Ridge's ‘ecumenical expressivist’ theory—fails to explain identity conditions for normative (...) propositions. Second, I argue that this failure motivates a general constraint—the ‘unity requirement’—that any expressivist theory of propositions must provide a unified nonrepresentational explanation of that in virtue of which propositional attitudes have the content that they have. Third, I argue that conceptual role accounts of content provide a promising framework in which to develop an expressivist theory of cognitive propositions. (shrink)

Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combining an interpretationist understanding of belief with a nonfactualist view of normative belief content. This results in (...) a view I call ‘interpretative expressivism’. I then argue that traditional arguments employed by expressivists that normative statements express noncognitive attitudes can just as well support the claim that normative statements express nonfactual or nonrepresentational beliefs. Finally, I argue that this view has a number of advantages to versions of expressivism that deny that normative statements express non-deflationary normative beliefs. (shrink)

A combination of emerging life support technologies and entrenched organ donation practices are complicating the physician's task of determining death. On the one hand, technologies that support or replace ventilation and circulation may render the diagnosis of death ambiguous. On the other, transplantation of vital organs requires timely and accurate declaration of death of the donor to keep the organs as healthy as possible. These two factors have led to disagreements among physicians and scholars on the precise moment of death. (...) In this article, I suggest that the debate about exactly when a person dies can benefit from distinguishing the strict biological concept of death from the medical standards for determining human death, and I show how an appreciation of the difference between the permanent and irreversible cessation of circulation is helpful in understanding the reasons for the two approaches to determining when death should be declared. (shrink)

I show that Frege's statement (In the Epilogue to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetic v. II) of a way to avoid Russell's paradox is defective, in that he presents two different methods as if they were one. One of these "ways out" is notably more plausible than the other, and is almost surely what Frege really intended. The well-known arguments of Lesniewski, Geach, and Quine that Frege's revision of his system is inadequate to avoid paradox are not affected by the ambiguity (...) of Frede's statement. But a rectnt argument by Linsky and Schumm (Analysis 82 (1971-72), 5-7), intended as a very simple derivation of a contradiction within Frege's revised system, is valid only for the less plausible of the two versions of Frege's way out, and thus is not an effective attack on the revision that Frege intended to make. (shrink)

Notwithstanding these wise pronouncements, my project here is to characterize the biological phenomenon of death of the higher animal species, such as vertebrates. My claim is that the formulation of “whole- brain death ” provides the most congruent map for our correct understanding of the concept of death. This essay builds upon the foundation my colleagues and I have laid since 1981 to characterize the concept of death and refine when this event occurs. Although our society's well-accepted program of multiple (...) organ procurement for transplantation requires the organ donor first to be dead, the concept of brain death is not merely a social contrivance to permit us to obtain the benefits of organ procurement. Rather, the concept of whole- brain death stands independently as the most accurate biological representation of the demise of the human organism. (shrink)

The shape of a life hypothesis holds that the temporal sequence of good or bad times in a life can itself be a valuable feature of that life. This is generally thought to be incompatible with additivism about lifetime well-being, which holds that lifetime well-being is fully determined by momentary well-being. This paper examines Dale Dorsey’s recent argument that these views are in fact compatible. I argue that accepting the conjunction of these views requires stronger commitments than Dorsey recognizes. After (...) arguing that these commitments are problematic, I conclude that we should reject the compatibility claim. (shrink)

In previous publications we have criticized the usual application of information theory to quantal situations and proposed a new version of information-theoretic quantum statistics. This paper is the first in a two-part series in which our new approach is applied to the fundamental problem of thermodynamic equilibrium. Part I deals in particular with informational definitions of equilibrium and the identification of thermodynamic analogs in our modified quantum statistics formalism.

Among the old and new controversies over brain death, none is more fundamental than whether brain death is equivalent to the biological phenomenon of human death. Here, I defend this equivalency by offering a brief conceptual justification for this view of brain death, a subject that Andrew Huang and I recently analyzed elsewhere in greater detail. My defense of the concept of brain death has evolved since Bernard Gert, Charles Culver, and I first addressed it in 1981, a development that (...) paralleled advances in intensive care unit treatment. The century‐old concept of the organism as a whole provides the fundamental justification for the equivalency of brain death and human death. In our technological age, in which increasing numbers of components and systems of an organism can be kept alive, and for longer intervals, the permanent cessation of functioning of the organism as a whole is the phenomenon that best corresponds to its death. (shrink)

This paper examines the prospects for an expressivist theory of prudential thought and discussion, or thought and discussion about what is good for us or what makes our lives go well. It is becoming increasingly common to view prudential thought and discussion as a kind of normative thought and discussion. If this is right, then expressivism, like any other meta-normative view, must be able to explain prudential thought and discussion. However, existing expressivist theories offer no such explanation and lack the (...) resources to construct one. I argue that the best strategy for expressivists is to adopt a fitting attitudes account of prudential concepts. More specifically, I propose that expressivists adopt the rational care theory of well-being, according to which claims about what is good for a person are equivalent to claims about what it is rational to want for that person insofar as one cares for them. In doing so, I defend the rational care theory against its most pressing objection and argue that the view provides an independently attractive account of prudential thought and discussion that fits well with the expressivist’s aim to explain normative thought and discussion in terms of its distinctive practical function. (shrink)

In an attempt to learn from COVID-19, this essay features six responses to the question: what did COVID-19 teach us, expose in us, or purge out of us when it comes to spiritual formation in Christ? Each response was written independently of the others by one of the coauthors. Diane J. Chandler focuses in on how COVID-19 exposed grievous inequities for ethnic groups in the American church and broader society. Kelly M. Kapic reminds us of the goodness of human finitude (...) and how COVID restrictions have forced many of us to embrace our limitations. Siang-Yang Tan reflects on eight lessons he has learned during this pandemic year in his role shepherding a local church. James C. Wilhoit calls us to consider the structures that are needed for local church leadership to make wise and godly decisions in times of crisis. Richard Peace draws our attention to what might be learned from the forced monasticism brought about by COVID-19 quarantines. Finally, Ruth Haley Barton pauses to consider the interdependence of human life that has been dramatically illustrated by this pandemic. While these six responses certainly do not exhaust all there is for the church to learn from COVID, we present them in the spirit of “O Lord, teach us what we do not see” and hope they will inspire your own reflections. (shrink)

The necessity of emending immundas… dapes in 78 to immundos… pedes has long been recognized, but I argue here that the text is unsatisfactory in three further respects: the difficulties of style, sense, and punctuation in 73–75; diuitiis in 76, wrongly retained by most editors and, when emended, wrongly emended to deliciis; and raros in 77, of which no satisfactory explanation has been offered.